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Abstract. This study aims at empirically investigating whether technology incubators help academic 
high-tech start-ups to establish collaborations with other organizations, thus increasing the 
competitiveness of these firms. In doing so, we take into account the specificities of academic high-
tech start-ups with respect to their non-academic counterparts. We compare the effects of incubation on 
academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups through econometric estimates using a large sample of 
Italian firms. Our findings suggest that incubated academic high-tech start-ups do not enjoy any 
advantages in establishing collaborations with respect to their non-incubated peers. Conversely, 
technology incubators do help non-academic high-tech start-ups in establishing collaborations with 
public research organizations. We thus come to the interesting conclusion that the effects of incubation 
are moderated by the genetic characteristics of incubated firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the mid 1990s, European universities and other public research organizations 
have been increasingly involved in activities aimed at establishing new high-tech 
firms (OECD, 1998; Wright et al., 2008, ch. 1). The establishment of these firms has 
been seen by their parent organizations as an opportunity to pursue several objectives: 
i) commercially exploit the results of academic research, ii) contribute to the 
development of the areas where these organizations were located, and iii) provide an 
alternative source of employment for academic researchers (Iacobucci et al., 2011). 
Despite high expectations, the performance of the high-tech start-ups established by 
European public research organizations have been disappointing. In particular, these 
firms tend to remain small (Degroof and Roberts, 2004).  
Understanding why the high-tech start-ups created by European public research 
organizations fail to grow has attracted the interest of the scientific community. Many 
scholars have, thus, started investigating the terms and conditions that may increase 
the economic competitiveness and favour the development of these firms (for a 
review, see Rothaermel et al., 2007).  
One possible explanation of the dismal performance of academic high-tech 
start-ups1 lies in the genetic characteristics that these firms inherit from their founders 
(Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005; Colombo and Piva, 2008). Being created by academic 
personnel with great technical and scientific education and work experience in 
academic research but limited industry-specific work experience, these firms 
generally have outstanding technological and scientific competencies, but lack 
industry-specific and managerial competencies. They also are short of the commercial 
resources (e.g., brand, sale force, distribution channels) necessary for rapid and 
effective commercialization of their products and services.  
In order to obtain access to these resources and competencies, alliances with 
other firms could play a crucial role. Indeed, previous studies have highlighted that 
these arrangements allow high-tech start-ups to fill the resource and competence gaps 
they suffer from in the early stages of their existence (Pisano, 1991; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Gans and Stern, 2003). Nevertheless, as the social capital of the 
founders of academic high-tech start-ups is generally oriented to the public research 
1 Academic high-tech start-ups are defined here as high-tech start-ups created by academics, i.e., (full-
time or part-time) personnel of public research organizations and Ph.D. students who were actively 
involved in academic research immediately before founding the firm (Mustar et al., 2006). 
2 
 
                                                 
environment, it may prove difficult for these firms to establish collaborations with 
other firms because of lack of suitable business contacts. In accordance with this 
view, Colombo and Piva (2012) shows that academic high-tech start-ups are more 
inclined than non-academic ones to establish technological alliances with and 
purchase technical services from public research organizations. Conversely, they are 
not prone to establish alliances with other firms.  
In this area, technology incubators may play a valuable enabling role. 
Technology incubators are property-based initiatives which provide young 
entrepreneurial firms with physical facilities and technical and business services 
(OECD, 1997), with the aim of promoting firm development (Hackett and Dilts, 
2004). In addition to office space they provide newly founded ventures with a set of 
services including access to infrastructures and facilities, secretarial support, but also 
more elaborate services, such as financial consultancy, technical and managerial 
advise, and assistance in business plan development (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005). 
Moreover, they may assist new ventures in establishing collaborations with a broad 
range of actors (Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2005; Rothschild and Darr, 2005; Bergek and 
Norrman, 2008). In particular, technology incubators may foster both formal 
agreements and informal interactions between the incubated firms and promote the 
establishment of linkages between them and academic organizations (Schwartz and 
Hornych, 2010). Therefore, technology incubators may be regarded as an effective 
mechanism to help academic high-tech start-ups collaborate with other organizations, 
thereby effectively contributing to the competitiveness of the former firms. In fact, the 
location of academic high-tech start-ups in technology incubators is a widespread 
phenomenon. Notably, incubators have been used by many technology transfer offices 
to foster the creation of new companies aimed at commercializing the results of 
academic research (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically whether technology 
incubators indeed help academic high-tech start-ups to overcome the obstacles they 
typically encounter in establishing collaborations with other firms. In order to assess 
the impact of incubation in this domain, we compare the propensity of incubated and 
non-incubated academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborations with third 
parties. We distinguish collaborations with private firms from those with academic 
organizations. Moreover, we explore the impact of incubation on the establishment of 
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collaborations also for incubated and non-incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups. 
In this way, we check whether the allegedly positive effect of incubation on firms’ 
collaboration activity depends on whether the incubated firms are academic or non-
academic high-tech start-ups.  
The results of our econometric analysis on a sample of Italian high-tech start-
ups suggest that technology incubators do not manage to foster the collaborative 
activity of academic high-tech start-ups. Indeed, incubated academic high-tech start-
ups do not enjoy any advantage in establishing collaborations with third parties (and 
notably, with private firms) with respect to their non-incubated peers. This does not 
mean that technology incubators fail to help high-tech start-ups to establish 
collaborations. Indeed, our results show that incubated non-academic high-tech start-
ups find it easier than their non-incubated counterparts to establish collaborations of 
commercial and technical nature with public research organizations and to in-source 
consultancy services from these organizations.   
Our analysis is relevant in terms of both theory development and potential 
policy implications. On the one hand, it contributes to both the literature on academic 
entrepreneurship and the debate on the effectiveness of technology incubators, as we 
will extensively discuss in the conclusions. On the other hand, our findings have 
important implications for officers of both incubators and technology transfer offices 
and for policy makers in that they highlight the specific challenges that are to be faced 
to sustain the development of different types of high-tech start-ups. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection 
procedures and provides some empirical evidence on both academic high-tech start-
ups and technology incubators in Italy. Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics 
on the collaboration activity of the sample firms, specifies the econometric models, 
introduces the variables used in our empirical analysis, and presents the results of the 
estimates. Section 4 discusses the main findings, highlights their contribution to the 
literature, acknowledges the limitations of the study, identifies new avenues for future 
research, and presents policy implications. 
 
2. Data  
This section is aimed at describing the database we use in the empirical analysis 
and presenting some empirical evidence on Italian academic high-tech start-ups and 
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on the phenomenon of technology incubation in Italy. Specifically, Section 2.1 
describes the methodology of construction of our dataset. Section 2.2 illustrates the 
distributions by industry, location and year of foundation of the academic high-tech 
start-ups included in our database and compares them to the distributions of non-
academic high-tech start-ups. Section 2.3 presents some figures about Italian 
technology incubators. 
2.1. Data collection  
To study the impact of incubation on the propensity of academic and non-
academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborations we used a sample of 615 
Italian owner-managed high-tech firms. The sample firms were drawn from the 2010 
release of the RITA (Research on Entrepreneurship in Advanced Technologies) 
directory and were representative of the Italian population of young (i.e., less than 25-
year-old) high-tech start-ups. They operate in the following manufacturing and 
service industries: aerospace; robotics and process automation equipment; ICT 
manufacturing (i.e., computers; electronic components; telecommunication 
equipment; optical, medical and electronic instruments); biotechnology; 
pharmaceuticals; chemicals and advanced materials; equipment and components for 
energy production; multimedia content; Internet services (ISP, e-commerce, web-
related services); telecommunication services; software; environmental services; and 
R&D and engineering services. Developed at Politecnico di Milano by the RITA 
Observatory research team, the RITA directory is the most reliable source of data 
presently available on Italian high-tech start-ups. As of January 1st, 2009, it stored 
information on 1,646 firms that were representative of the Italian population of high-
tech start-ups by both industry and geographic area. This information included data on 
firms’ characteristics obtained through periodic surveys and interviews with the firms’ 
owner-managers. In particular, respondents were asked whether their firms 
established commercial and/or technological alliances with other companies and 
public research organizations. They also indicated whether they purchased R&D and 
other technical services from these latter organizations and whether they were backed 
by corporate venture capitalists (CVC). Moreover, the RITA directory included 
information relating to the educational attainments and prior work experience of each 
founder classified according to the functional activity (R&D, production, sales, etc.), 
hierarchical position, and sector of activity of the employer. Relying on this 
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information we were able to distinguish academic and non-academic high-tech start-
ups. 
2.2. Academic high-tech start-ups in Italy 
The 1,646 firms included in the RITA directory as of January 1st, 2009 comprise 
244 academic high-tech start-ups. In this section we use information on these firms to 
provide empirical evidence on Italian academic high-tech start-ups. It is fair to 
acknowledge that, as no official census exists of Italian academic high-tech start-ups, 
we cannot be sure that these 244 firms were representative of the population of Italian 
academic high-tech start-ups. However, being the 1,646 firms included in the RITA 
directory representative of the Italian population of high-tech start-ups, we are quite 
confident that also the 244 academic high-tech start-ups were representative of the 
Italian population of academic high-tech start-ups.    
Table I reports the distributions by industry, macroarea of location, and year of 
foundation of both the 244 academic high-tech start-ups and the remaining 1,402 non-
academic high-tech start-ups included in the RITA directory.  
[Table I around here] 
The table reveals that Italian academic high-tech start-ups mainly operate in the 
software (23.0% of the 244 firms), biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (18.8%), and 
ICT manufacturing industries (17.2%). Quite interestingly the distribution of 
academic high-tech start-ups by industry is significantly different from the 
distribution of non-academic high-tech start-ups. The former firms are indeed 
relatively more present in science-based industries such as biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals and R&D and engineering services, and in environmental services, 
while they are less present in Internet services and ICT manufacturing industries.  
As to the geographical distribution, academic high-tech start-ups are mainly 
located in the North-West (33.6%) of Italy and are particularly concentrated in the 
provinces of Milan (12.7%) and Turin (10.2%). No significant differences exist 
between academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups as to the distribution across 
the four geographical macroareas (χ2(3)=4.02).  
As to the year of foundation, 77.9% of the sample academic high-tech start-ups 
have been established since 2000. The significant increase in the rates of new firms’ 
foundation that was registered after the Nineties may be a consequence of the growing 
support that Italian public research institutions started providing to the creation and 
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development of academic high-tech start-ups. In the last decade, many universities 
have indeed promoted measures such as the creation of technology transfer offices or 
the constitution of university venture capital funds. Quite interestingly, academic 
high-tech start-ups are on average younger than their non-academic counterparts; the 
percentage of non-academic high-tech start-ups founded after 2000 is indeed much 
lower (46.5%).  
2.3. Incubation in Italy 
In Italy technology incubators can be classified into three groups: incubators 
within science parks,2 incubators within Business Innovation Centres (BICs) and 
university incubators. At the beginning of 2010, in Italy there were 29 science parks 
affiliated to the national network of scientific and technological parks APSTI, 33 
BICs affiliated to the European BIC Network, and 10 university incubators. Table II 
reports the distributions of these organizations by macroarea of location and year of 
establishment.  
[Table II around here] 
Italian technology incubators are mainly situated in most developed northern 
regions (53.5% of the total). Quite interestingly, the three groups of incubators 
mentioned above exhibit significant differences as to their geographical distribution. 
While most science parks and university incubators are located in the North of the 
country (55.2% and 60%, respectively), the percentage of BICs in this area is lower 
(48.5%). The higher percentage of BICs in the less developed regions of the Centre 
and South of Italy is in line with the view according to which such initiatives are 
instrumental to the restructuring and rejuvenation of disadvantaged regions. 
As to the year of foundation, most incubators have been established in the 
Nineties. However, the three groups of incubators again exhibit different distributions 
across the three decades considered in Table II. While all Italian university incubators 
have been founded since 2000, with the only exception of the incubator of Politecnico 
di Torino, which was established in 1999, only 24% of the science parks and 12% of 
the BICs were established in the last decade.   
2 We define a “science park” as a property-based initiative which (i) has formal operational links with 
centers of knowledge creation, such as universities and (public and/or private) research centers, (ii) is 
designed to encourage the formation and growth of innovative (generally science-based) businesses, 
and (iii) has a management function which is actively engaged in the transfer of technology and 
business skills to “customer” organizations (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002). 
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To provide figures on the firms hosted in Italian technology incubators, we 
surveyed the websites of the 71 incubators identified in Italy and the websites of the 
national associations they are members of.3 Altogether, at the beginning of 2010 
Italian incubators hosted more than 1,800 companies with more than 13,000 
employees.  
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
This Section illustrates the empirical analysis. Section 3.1 presents some 
descriptive statistics on the collaboration activity of the sample firms. In Section 3.2 
we specify the econometric models and describe the (dependent and independent) 
variables included in these models. Section 3.3 illustrates the econometric results. 
3.1. Academic high-tech start-ups, incubation and collaboration activity: 
qualitative evidence 
The sample considered here is composed of 615 out of the 1,646 high-tech start-
ups included in the RITA directory as of January 1st, 2009. The sample comprises 
only the firms for which we were able to build a complete dataset relating to the 
variables of interest. The sample firms included 99 incubated start-ups (16.0% of the 
sample). 45.4% of the incubated firms were academic start-ups (45 firms). The 
percentage of academic start-ups out of the 459 non-incubated start-ups was 
significantly lower: less than 12.4% (57 firms). This evidence indicates that 
incubation is a much more common phenomenon among academic high-tech start-ups 
than among their non-academic peers. 
[Table III around here] 
Table III provides some descriptive statistics on the collaboration activity of the 
sample firms. The table distinguishes four groups of firms: incubated academic high-
tech start-ups, non-incubated academic high-tech start-ups, incubated non-academic 
high-tech start-ups, and non-incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups.  
As to the establishment of alliances with other firms, the share of collaborating 
firms is systematically greater in the incubated categories than in the corresponding 
3 We considered the following associations: the Italian Association of Scientific and Technological 
Parks (APSTI), the Italian association of BICs (BIC Italia Net), the Association of the Italian 
Incubators and Academic Business Plan Competitions (PNICube), and the Italian Network for the 
Valorisation of University Research (Netval).  
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non-incubated ones for both academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups. 
However, none of these differences are found to be statistically significant at 
conventional confidence levels. Hence, from this preliminary analysis, we conclude 
that location in a technology incubator seems to have no positive effects on the ability 
of neither academic nor non-academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborative 
relationships with other firms.  
However, incubation helps non-academic high-tech start-ups establish 
collaborations with and purchase consultancy services from public research 
organisations. The differences are significant at conventional confidence levels. 
Conversely, no difference emerges as to this type of relationships between incubated 
and non-incubated high-tech academic start-ups. It is also noteworthy that we do not 
find any significant difference in the propensity to establish collaborations of the 
different types between incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups and academic 
high-tech start-ups, be they incubated or not.4 This evidence suggests that incubators’ 
ability to promote the establishment of linkages between incubated firms and 
academic organizations reduces the advantages that academic high-tech start-ups 
enjoy in this respect. 
In Table III we do not distinguish incubated high-tech start-ups by the type of 
incubator. However, one may wonder whether science parks, BICs and university 
incubators have different effects on the collaboration activity of the incubated 
academic and non-academic high-tech start-ups. In Table A.I of the Appendix we 
report descriptive statistics on the collaboration activity of the sample firms incubated 
in science parks, BICs and university incubators. The share of collaborating firms 
does not differ at conventional confidence levels across the three groups of 
incubators. 
In the Appendix we also further investigate the effects of incubation on the 
collaboration activity of academic high-tech start-ups by considering the composition 
of firm founding team. In particular, we distinguish the high-tech start-ups founded by 
academics only and those created by teams including both academics and non-
academics. The data reported in Table A.II are in line with those shown in Table III: 
4 For the sake of synthesis these results are not reported in Table III. They are available from the 
authors upon request.  
9 
 
                                                 
incubation has no effects on the collaboration activity of any academic high-tech start-
ups.  
3.2. Econometric methodology 
We compare the impact of incubation on academic and non-academic high-tech 
start-ups, by estimating the following Logit models: 
Dis = α1s + β1sDAsu_Inci + β2sDAsu_NoInci + β3sDNoAsu_Inci + δsZi + εis  (1) 
where Dis, with s ranging from 1 to 6, indicates a set of 6 dummy variables, measuring 
whether firm i established a collaboration of type s (see below). DAsu_Inci, 
DAsu_NoInci, and DNoAsu_Inci are the key explanatory variables; Zi is a vector of 
firm-specific control variables; and εis is the error term.  
The 6 dependent variables (see Table IV for definitions) indicate the different 
types of collaborations that might have been established by the focal start-ups with 
other companies and public research organisations. We first consider the formation of 
alliances with other firms, and we distinguish between commercial alliances 
(DCommAllFirmi) and technological alliances (DTechAllFirmi). The same distinction 
is made for alliances established with public research organizations 
(DCommAllResOrgi and DTechAllResOrgi). In addition, we consider CVC-backing 
(DCVCi) as a special type of collaboration established with firms, and the acquisition 
of consultancy services from public research organizations (DConsultResOrgi) as a 
special form of collaboration with academic institutions. 
[Table IV around here] 
Table IV also provides the definitions of the explanatory variables. The models 
include three independent dummy variables: DAsu_Inci, DAsu_NoInci, and 
DNoAsu_Inci. DAsu_Inci and DNoAsu_Inci indicate firms that have been located in a 
technology incubator. The former variable takes value 1 if the incubated firm i is an 
academic high-tech start-up, while the latter equals 1 for incubated non-academic 
high-tech start-ups. DAsu_NoInci takes value 1 if firm i is an academic high-tech start-
up that has never been located in a technology incubator. Its inclusion in the model 
specification allows to highlight the effects of incubation on academic high-tech start-
ups by comparing the coefficients of DAsu_Inci with those of  DAsu_NoInci. 
Similarly the coefficients of DNoAsu_Inci allow us to assess the impact of incubation 
on non-academic high-tech start-ups.  
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The controls include a series of indicators of the human capital characteristics of 
the firm’s founders at the time of firm’s foundation. As for education, we distinguish 
between average university-level education in economic and managerial ﬁelds 
(EcoEduci) and in scientiﬁc and technical ﬁelds (TechEduci). As for work experience, 
we differentiate the experience gained by firm’s founders in the same industry of the 
start-up by function. We indeed distinguish the average number of years of work 
experience in R&D, design, engineering, and production departments 
(TechWorkExpi), and in marketing, sale, and customer care functions (ComWorkExpi). 
In addition, we consider founders’ prior work experience in other industries than the 
one of the start-up (OtherWorkExpi). We also control for founders’ managerial 
competencies through DManageri. DManageri is a dummy variable taking value 1 if 
one or more founders had a managerial position in a medium-large company prior to 
the establishment of the firm.  
The controls also include the number of years elapsed since firm’s foundation 
(Agei) and its squared value (SqAgei), four geographical dummy variables5 and four 
industry dummies.6 Correlation among the explanatory variables is low overall, thus 
suggesting the absence of any relevant problems of multicollinearity. 
3.3. Results 
[Table V around here] 
The results of the econometric analysis are illustrated in Table V. Let us start 
from some preliminary considerations about the differences between academic and 
non-academic high-tech start-ups in the propensity to establish collaborative 
relationships with third parties. Both DAsu_Inci and DAsu_NoInci exhibit negative 
coefficients (significant at 10%) in Model 2 and positive ones (significant at 10% and 
5%, respectively) in Model 6. This is in line with Colombo and Piva (2012). 
Academic high-tech start-ups (be they incubated or not) are relatively less prone to 
establish technological alliances with other firms, but more likely to acquire 
consulting services from public research organizations than non-incubated non-
5 In order to control for economical, historical and cultural differences, Italy’s twenty administrative 
regions were grouped into five macroareas: North-West; North-East; Centre; and South and islands. 
6 We consider four main industries: ICT manufacturing; other high-tech manufacturing; ICT services; 
and other high-tech services. Other high-tech manufacturing includes aerospace, robotics and process 
automation equipment, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and advanced materials, and 
equipment and components for energy production. ICT services include multimedia content, Internet 
services, telecommunication services, and software. Other high-tech services include environmental 
services and R&D and engineering services. 
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academic high-tech start-ups. DAsu_NoInci exhibits also a negative and (weakly) 
significant coefficient in Model 1 and a positive and significant (at 1%) coefficient in 
Model 5. The coefficients of DAsu_Inci in these regressions have the same signs but 
are not significant. Hence, non-incubated academic high-tech start-ups are also less 
prone to establish commercial alliances with other firms and more prone to establish 
technological alliances with research organizations than their non-academic peers.  
In order to assess whether technology incubators help academic high-tech start-
ups to establish collaborations with third parties, we have compared the coefficients 
of DAsu_Inci and DAsu_NoInci through the Wald χ2 tests reported in the last row of 
Table V. For most dependent variables no statistically significant difference is found 
between the two coefficients. The only exception is the (weakly) significant 
difference as to commercial alliances with research organisations. Altogether these 
results suggest that location in a technology incubator does not contribute to remove 
the obstacles that academic high-tech start-ups encounter in teaming up with private 
firms.  
Let us now check whether technology incubators are of any help to non-
academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborations with third parties. To do so, 
we examine the coefficients of DNoAsu_Inci. DNoAsu_Inci exhibits positive and 
significant coefficients in three out of the six models: the exceptions are Models 1 to 
3, relating to alliances with other firms and CVC-backing. Our estimates suggest that 
incubated non-academic high-tech start-ups are more likely than their non-incubated 
peers to establish both technological alliances with other firms and any type of 
collaboration with public research organisations. As to this latter type of 
collaborations, our findings suggest that the likelihood of establishing commercial and 
technological alliances increases by respectively 9% and 33% for incubated non-
academic high-tech start-ups with respect to their non-incubated counterparts, when 
other regressors are evaluated at their mean, while the likelihood of purchasing 
consultancy services from these organizations increases by 17%.   
For the sake of synthesis we do not discuss here the coefficients of the control 
variables.  
To check the robustness of our results we performed two different tests. First, 
we checked whether a survivorship bias in data might undermine the empirical 
analysis on the propensity to establish collaborative relationships with third parties. 
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To do so, we focused attention on the RITA 2000 sample. We do have exit data for 
these firms in the 2000-2003 period. Out of the 401 ﬁrms composing the sample, 86 
exited before 2003. As a direct way to control for a possible survivorship bias, we 
adapted a typical Heckman two-step procedure commonly used in empirical studies 
on ﬁrm growth dynamics (e.g., Evans, 1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994) to our speciﬁc 
framework.  
In particular, we ﬁrst estimated a probit model on the exit of firms in the RITA 
2000 sample in the 2000–2003 period conditional on survival up to the end of 1999. 
The independent variables of this selection model include founders’ human capital 
variables (EcoEduci, TechEduci, TechWorkExpi, ComWorkExpi, OtherWorkExpi, and 
DManageri), firm’s age in 1999 (Age1999i), two dummy variables aimed at signaling, 
respectively, the firms that received a venture capital investment by 2000 (DVC1999i) 
and the academic high-tech start-ups (DAsui), and industrial and geographical 
controls. The estimates are shown in the Appendix Table A.III.  
Based on these estimates, we could compute the Inverse Mills Ratio of ﬁrm exit 
for 383 out of the 615 sample ﬁrms. This ratio was then inserted as a control for 
survivorship bias in the models presented in Table V. This additional variable controls 
for the unobserved heterogeneity that affects both a ﬁrm’s probability of being 
sampled in following years and its propensity to establish collaborative relationships 
with third parties, allowing more consistent estimates of the parameters of the models 
presented in Table V. 
The estimates shown in the Appendix Table A.IV indicate that the coefficient of 
the Inverse Mills Ratio is negative and statistically significant in four models out of 
six. This points to the presence of unobserved factors that are positively (negatively) 
correlated with a firm’s likelihood of exit and are negatively (positively) correlated 
with the establishment of technological alliances (with either other firms or public 
research organizations), CVC-backing and the purchase of consultancy services from 
public research organizations. Moreover, the inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio 
control determines some changes in the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
First, in contrast with the results in Table V, the coefficients of DAsu_Inci and 
DAsu_NoInci are not significant in Models 1 and 2. In line with Colombo and Piva 
(2012), we do not find any significant differences between academic and non-
academic high-tech start-ups, be they incubated or not, with respect to the propensity 
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to establish alliances with other firms, either of a technological or commercial nature. 
Second, the results in Table A.IV indicate that academic high-tech start-ups are more 
likely to be CVC-backed than their non-academic counterparts. This may be a 
consequence of a greater likelihood of receiving an offer from a CVC investor for 
academic high-tech start-ups. Indeed, as CVC investments are frequently aimed at 
opening a “technology window” on a promising new technology (Ernst et al., 2005), 
the strong scientific and technological competencies of academic high-tech start-ups 
may make these firms more attractive for CVC investors than non-academic high-tech 
start-ups. In spite of these differences, the results of the estimates in Table A.IV 
indicate that location in a technology incubator does not affect the collaboration 
activity of academic high-tech start-ups. We may thus conclude that our key findings 
are not affected by survivorship bias. 
The second check of robustness is aimed at taking into account possible 
unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, there may be unobserved factors (such as the size 
of founders’ network of social contacts) that explain both the probability of being 
incubated and the probability to establish collaborations. To account for possible 
unobserved heterogeneity that, if correlated with regressors, may lead to biased 
estimates of the parameters of interest, we run additional estimates replacing the 
geographical and industry dummies with five industry- and area-specific control 
variables (see the Appendix Table A.V for a description). These additional estimates 
are shown in the Appendix Table A.VI. The coefficients of our independent variables 
are almost unchanged in terms of significance and sign (with the only exception of the 
coefficient of DNoAsu_Inci that is not significant in Model 4). 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
The present study was aimed at understanding whether technology incubators 
contribute to the competitiveness of academic high-tech start-ups by helping these 
firms to establish collaborations with third party organizations. In doing so, we also 
checked whether incubation differently affects the collaboration activity of academic 
and non-academic high-tech start-ups.  
We have analysed and compared the effects of incubation on academic and non-
academic high-tech start-ups through the estimates of several Logit models using a 
sample of Italian high-tech start-ups. The results of the econometric estimates provide 
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several original insights. First, they show that the impact of incubation on the 
collaboration activity of academic high-tech start-ups is negligible. Quite 
unsurprisingly, technology incubators do not foster the establishment by this type of 
firms of collaborations with research organizations. Academic high-tech start-ups find 
it easier to collaborate with academia than their non-academic peers, irrespective of 
incubation. As academic founders possess a wider network of social contacts in the 
public research sector than non-academic founders, academic high-tech start-ups are 
more embedded within the scientific community (Murray, 2004). Hence, the support 
eventually offered in this domain by technology incubators is useless. More 
interestingly, location in a technology incubator does not foster academic high-tech 
start-ups’ collaborations with other firms either. This is a missing opportunity for 
increasing the competitiveness of academic high-tech start-ups. Indeed, because of 
their genetic characteristics, and the associated lack of industry-specific technical and 
commercial competencies, academic high-tech start-ups have great incentives to 
establish this type of collaborations in order to access and take advantage of the 
competencies and resources possessed by industrial partners, notably in the 
commercial sphere. However, in spite of these incentives they find it difficult to 
engage in collaborations with other firms because they lack suitable social capital. 
Hence, technology incubators may be a surrogate for academic high-tech start-ups’ 
lack of business contacts, by creating a bridge between these firms and potential 
industrial partners. However, our findings suggest that in Italy technology incubators 
have failed to perform this crucial bridging function. They seem to have even reduced 
the incentives of academic start-ups to obtain CVC-backing, even though the evidence 
on this issue admittedly is weak.  
Second, despite these disappointing results concerning the contribution of 
technology incubators to academic high-tech start-ups’ collaboration activity, our 
estimates provide evidence of a substantial impact of incubation on the collaboration 
activity of non-academic high-tech start-ups. In line with the studies which found that 
incubated firms exhibit a higher propensity to collaborate with academic institutions 
than comparable non-incubated firms (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Lindelöf and 
Löfsten, 2004; Fukugawa, 2006; Yang et al., 2009), we find that technology 
incubators indeed help non-academic high-tech start-ups in establishing collaborations 
with public research organizations, thereby providing an effective bridge with the 
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academia. As collaborations with academic institutions allow high-tech start-ups gain 
access to the most recent scientific knowledge and expertise in specific technological 
fields, and to tools and machinery not available in-house due to cost reasons, the 
bridging role performed by technology incubators may clearly have positive effects 
on the performance of non-academic high-tech start-ups.  
This study has a number of limitations that open up interesting avenues for 
future research. First, although technology incubators may increase the 
competitiveness of academic high-tech start-ups in several ways, we have restricted 
our analysis to their contribution to the establishment of collaborations. To have the 
whole picture of the role of technology incubators in promoting the development of 
academic entrepreneurship, a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
incubation on academic high-tech start-ups’ performance is on order. Second, because 
of a “small number” problem, we have not considered here the heterogeneity among 
Italian technology incubators. Further research work is thus needed to understand 
whether and how incubator-specific characteristics, such as their overall size, the 
competencies of the incubator staff, the nature of the sponsoring organizations, and 
the types of services offered, moderate the effects of incubated location on the 
collaboration activity of incubated firms. Third, all the sample firms are located in a 
single country with specific institutional characteristics. For instance, in Italy public 
policies to support the creation and development of technology incubators are quite 
recent. This clearly influences the contribution of incubators to start-ups’ 
development. Thus, it would be interesting to extend the comparative analysis 
presented in this paper to other countries to check whether and how national 
institutional characteristics influence the effects of incubation on academic high-tech 
start-ups and its differential impact on distinct types of high-tech start-ups. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of this study, we think that our findings 
contribute to both the literature on academic entrepreneurship and the research stream 
on technology incubators. They also are very informative for the officers of 
incubators and technology transfer offices, and, more generally, for policy makers.  
In terms of contribution to the literature on academic entrepreneurship, our 
analysis adds to the research stream on new firm creation (Rothaermel et al., 2007). 
Several studies in this stream have examined the contribution of incubators to new 
firm creation (see, e.g., Clarysse et al., 2005; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005a). Here 
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we take a step further by providing insights on the contribution of incubators to firms’ 
collaboration activity and, indirectly, to their competitiveness.  
Our paper also adds to the studies that investigated the effectiveness of 
technology incubators. Many local economic development agencies, governments and 
other public institutions have looked at incubators as a policy instrument for 
enhancing the local economic and technological development and have provided 
resources to support incubating initiatives (OECD, 1997; European Commission, 
2002). As a consequence, since the Eighties several incubators have been created. 
After a period of euphoria about incubating initiatives, doubts were raised about their 
effectiveness in contributing to economic development (Autio and Klofsten, 1998; 
Sherman, 1999). A growing number of scholars have thus started investigating the 
impact of incubation at the firm level. The evidence provided by these studies is 
mixed (see, e.g., Siegel et al., 2003; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005b; Squicciarini, 
2008; 2009. See Colombo and Delmastro 2002 for a review of earlier studies), 
suggesting that technology incubators’ effectiveness possibly depends on their own 
characteristics, those of the geographical area where they are located, and the 
characteristics of incubated firms. Moreover, there are still important gaps in our 
understanding of the mechanisms that link incubation and firm performance. In this 
perspective, this paper makes two important contribution to this literature by showing 
that i) technology incubators do influence the collaboration activity of incubated firms 
and ii) the effects of incubation in this domain differ according to the different types 
of high-tech start-ups (namely, academic versus non-academic).   
This study has also interesting policy implications. Our findings highlight a key 
weakness of Italian technology incubators: they are not very effective in helping 
academic high-tech start-ups to establish collaborative relationships with other firms. 
Since 2000 the Italian government has subsidised the creation of several technology 
incubators by Italian universities with the aim of supporting the establishment and 
development of newly created firms. Most firms located in these incubators indeed 
are academic high-tech start-ups. The lack of support offered by technology 
incubators to the collaborative activity of this type of firms highlighted by our study 
points to a serious weakness of these initiatives. In order to overcome such a 
weakness, the officers of technology incubators should enlarge their network of 
contacts with firms and create more opportunities of interaction between incubated 
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start-ups and non-incubated firms. However, officers of technology incubators and 
policy makers should be aware that, because of the genetic characteristics of academic 
high-tech start-ups, these firms that are naturally prone to partner with research 
organizations, encounter serious difficulties in collaborating with private firms (e.g., 
due to differences in objectives, language and cognitive frames). In fact, incubation 
showed a more positive impact on the ability of non-academic high-tech start-ups to 
establish alliances with other firms, even though this positive effect was confined to 
technological alliances and was of small magnitude. Whether the difficulties 
experienced by academic high-tech start-ups make it impossible for technology 
incubators to foster the collaborative links between incubated academic high-tech 
start-ups and other private firms is open to debate. Conversely, our findings indicate 
that another important mission of technology incubators is more likely to prove 
successful. Italian technology incubators have been able to create an effective bridge 
between non-academic high-tech start-ups and public research organizations. This is 
an important contribution to the development of these firms that incubators’ officers 
should duly take into account when deciding about applications by non-academic 
high-tech start-ups. Our study clearly indicates that discrimination against application 
from this type of firms would make technology incubators far less successful.   
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Table I: Descriptive statistics on Italian high-tech start-ups. 
 
 
 
 
Academic  
high-tech start-ups 
Non-academic 
high-tech  start-ups 
 No. % No. %  
Industry     
   Aerospace 6      2.5 26      1.8 
   Robotics and process automation equipment 17      7.0 124      8.8 
   ICT manufacturing 42    17.2 370    26.4 
   Biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and 
advanced materials 
46    18.8 63      4.5 
   Equipment and components for energy 
production 
5      2.0 19      1.4 
   Multimedia content 2      0.8 25      1.8 
   Internet services  25    10.2 327    23.3 
   Telecommunication services 7      2.9 36      2.6 
   Software 56    23.0 363    25.9 
   Environmental services 23      9.4 16      1.1 
   R&D and engineering services 15      6.2 33      2.4 
   Total 244 100.0 1,402 100.0 
     
Macroarea of location     
   North-West 82    33.6 566    40.4 
   North-East 61    25.0 311    22.2 
   Centre 50    20.5 256    18.3 
   South and Islands 51    20.9 269    19.2 
   Total 244 100.0 1,402 100.0 
     
Year of foundation     
   1984-1989 7      2.9 190    13.6 
   1990-1994 15      6.2 199    14.2 
   1995-1999 32    13.1 361    25.8 
   2000-2004 95    38.9 387    27.6 
   2005-2008 95    38.9 265    18.9 
   Total 244 100.0 1,402 100.0 
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Table II: Descriptive statistics on Italian technology incubators. 
  No. % 
Macroarea of location   
   North-West 22 31.0 
   North-East 16 22.5 
   Centre 15 21.1 
   South and Islands 18 25.3 
   Total 71 100.0 
   
Year of foundation   
   1980-1989 13 18.3 
   1990-1999 38 53.5 
   2000-2009 20 28.2 
   Total 71 100.0 
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Table III: Descriptive statistics on the collaborations established by the sample high-tech start-ups. 
 Academic high-tech start-ups Non-academic high-tech start-ups 
 
Incubated 
(N=45) 
Non-incubated 
(N=57) χ2 test 
Incubated 
(N=54) 
Non-incubated 
(N=459) χ2 test 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have established alliances with other firms 55.6% 49.2% 0.42 61.1% 51.0% 1.99 
-commercial alliances 46.7% 36.8% 1.00 53.7% 43.6% 2.00 
-technological alliances 26.7% 22.8% 0.20 40.7% 29.8% 2.68 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have established alliances with public research 
organizations 
44.4% 50.9% 0.42 51.9% 20.7% 25.73*** 
-commercial alliances 11.1% 19.3% 1.27 18.5% 7.6% 7.16*** 
-technological alliances 40.0% 45.6% 0.32 50.0% 17.2% 31.69*** 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have acquired consultancy services from public 
research organizations 
35.6% 31.6% 0.18 29.6% 12.0% 12.62*** 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have obtained equity financing from a corporate 
venture capitalist 
6.7% 12.3% 0.90 3.7% 5.9% 0.43 
Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. 
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Table IV: Definition of the variables included in the econometric models. 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
DCommAllFirmi One for firms that have established one or more commercial alliances with other firms, zero otherwise. 
DTechAllFirmi One for firms that have established one or more technological alliances with other firms, zero otherwise. 
DCVCi One for firms that have obtained external equity financing from a corporate venture capitalist, zero otherwise.  
DCommAllResOrgi One for firms that have established one or more commercial alliances with public research organizations, zero otherwise. 
DTechAllResOrgi One for firms that have established one or more technological alliances with public research organizations, zero otherwise. 
DConsultResOrgi One for firms that have acquired consultancy services from public research organizations, zero otherwise. 
Independent variables  
DAsu_Inci One for academic high-tech start-ups that have been located in a technology incubator, zero otherwise.  
DAsu_NoInci One for academic high-tech start-ups that have never been located in a technology incubator, zero otherwise.  
DNoAsu_Inci One for non-academic high-tech start-ups that have been located in a technology incubator, zero otherwise.  
Controls  
EcoEduci Average number of years of economic and/or managerial education of founders at university level.  
TechEduci  Average number of years of scientiﬁc and/or technical education of founders at university level.  
TechWorkExpi Average number of years of technical work experience of founders in the same sector of the start-up before ﬁrm’s foundation.  
ComWorkExpi Average number of years of commercial work experience of founders in the same sector of the start-up before ﬁrm’s foundation.  
OtherWorkExpi Average number of years of work experience of founders in other sectors than the one of the start-up before ﬁrm's foundation.  
DManageri One for ﬁrms with one or more founders with a prior management position in a company with more than 100 employees.  
Agei Number of years since ﬁrm’s foundation.  
SqAgei Squared value of the number of years since ﬁrm’s foundation.  
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Table V: Results of the econometric estimates of the Logit models. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
  DCommAllFirm DTechAllFirm DCVC DCommAllResOrg DTechAllResOrg DConsultResOrg 
α0 Constant -1.113*** -1.371*** -4.508*** -2.720*** -3.245*** -3.437*** 
  (0.420) (0.470) (0.715) (0.644) (0.541) (0.669) 
α1 DAsu_Inci -0.180 -0.726* 0.179 -0.658 0.563 0.874* 
  (0.387) (0.415) (0.806) (0.643) (0.433) (0.449) 
α2 DAsu_NoInci -0.538* -0.698* 0.699 0.428 1.091*** 0.905** 
  (0.325) (0.381) (0.525) (0.464) (0.345) (0.370) 
α3 DNoAsu_Inci 0.306 0.307 -0.493 0.998** 1.533*** 1.089*** 
  (0.309) (0.302) (0.757) (0.408) (0.328) (0.350) 
α4 EcoEduci 0.065 0.155 0.344** 0.216 -0.007 0.220 
  (0.107) (0.110) (0.171) (0.150) (0.131) (0.149) 
α5 TechEduci 0.086** 0.115*** 0.152** 0.210*** 0.216*** 0.224*** 
  (0.042) (0.044) (0.072) (0.068) (0.051) (0.055) 
α6 TechWorkExpi 0.001 0.046** 0.055* -0.193** -0.017 -0.011 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.096) (0.026) (0.030) 
α7 ComWorkExpi 0.048 0.038 0.016 0.015 0.066** 0.038 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.054) (0.040) (0.028) (0.033) 
α8 OtherWorkExpi -0.014 -0.008 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.029** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
α9 DManageri -0.091 0.072 0.302 0.292 0.225 0.551** 
  (0.197) (0.212) (0.378) (0.306) (0.234) (0.253) 
α10 Agei 0.082 -0.028 0.021 -0.071 0.129** 0.045 
  (0.053) (0.058) (0.103) (0.081) (0.062) (0.074) 
α11 SqAgei -0.004** 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.005* -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
Geographical dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
        
χ2 39.119(17)*** 37.452(17)*** 24.978(17)*** 35.399(17)*** 84.269(17)*** 64.544(17)*** 
No. observations 615 615 615 615 615 615 
Log-likelihood -401.118 -356.673 -137.974 -177.912 -296.193 -246.041 
5 
 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.105 0.133 0.125 
Wald χ2 test: α1= α2 0.65 (1) 0.00 (1) 0.43 (1) 2.72 (1)* 1.26 (1) 0.00 (1) 
Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Robust standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses. 
For the sake of synthesis, estimated coefficients of industry and geographic area dummies are not reported.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.I: Descriptive statistics on the collaborations established by the sample high-tech start-ups incubated in science parks, BICs, and university incubators. 
 Academic high-tech start-ups Non-academic high-tech start-ups 
 
Incubated in 
science parks 
(N=11) 
Incubated 
in BICs  
(N=4) 
Incubated in 
universities 
(N=29) 
Fisher 
exact test 
Incubated in 
science parks  
(N=15) 
Incubated 
in BICs 
(N=22) 
Incubated in 
universities 
(N=6) 
Fisher 
exact test 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have established 
alliances with other firms 
54.6% 25.0% 62.1% 0.40 68.2% 53.3% 66.7% 0.69 
-commercial alliances 54.6% 25.0% 48.3% 0.72 63.6% 46.3% 50.0% 0.60 
-technological alliances 27.3% 25.0% 27.6% 1.00 45.4% 26.3% 50.0% 0.48 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have established 
alliances with public research organizations 
45.4% 25% 44.8% 0.8 50% 60% 66.7% 0.76 
-commercial alliances 9.1% 0.0% 10.3% 1.00 27.3% 13.3% 33.3% 0.54 
-technological alliances 45.4% 25.0% 38.0% 0.80 50.0% 53.3% 66.7% 0.84 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have acquired 
consultancy services from public research organizations 
27.3% 25.0% 38.0% 0.88 40.9% 20.0% 33.3% 0.44 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have obtained equity 
financing from a corporate venture capitalist 
27.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.02 4.6% 6.7% 0.0% 1.00 
Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. 
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Table A.II: Descriptive statistics on the collaborations established by the sample academic high-tech start-ups by type of founders. 
 
Academic high-tech start-ups with a founding 
team composed by academics only 
Academic high-tech start-ups founded by both 
academics and non-academics 
 
Incubated 
(N=25) 
Non-incubated 
(N=17) 
Fisher  
exact test 
Incubated 
(N=19) 
Non-incubated 
(N=40) 
Fisher  
exact test 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have established alliances with other 
firms 
60.0% 41.2% 0.35 47.4% 52.5% 0.79 
-commercial alliances 44.0% 29.4% 0.52 47.4% 40.0% 0.78 
-technological alliances 20.0% 17.6% 1.00 36.8% 25.0% 0.37 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have established alliances with public 
research organizations 
40% 58.8% 0.35 52.6% 47.5% 0.78 
-commercial alliances 16.0% 23.5% 0.69 5.3% 17.5% 0.42 
-technological alliances 36.0% 52.9% 0.35 47.4% 42.5% 0.78 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have acquired consultancy services from 
public research organizations 
48.0% 47.1% 1.00 21.0% 25.0% 1.00 
Percentage of high-tech start-ups that have obtained equity financing from a 
corporate venture capitalist 
0.0% 17.6% 0.06 15.8% 10.0% 0.67 
Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. 
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Table A.III: Determinants of firm inclusion in our sample: a probit model. 
  Exit 
α0 Constant -1.178** 
  (0.485) 
α1 EcoEduci 0.175** 
  (0.074) 
α2 TechEduci -0.002 
  (0.041) 
α3 TechWorkExpi 0.011 
  (0.023) 
α4 ComWorkExpi 0.038 
  (0.027) 
α5 OtherWorkExpi 0.025** 
  (0.010) 
α6 DManageri 0.007 
  (0.180) 
α7 DAsui -0.214 
  (0.370) 
α8 Age1999i -0.013 
  (0.017) 
α9 DVC1999i 0.444* 
  (0.269) 
Industry dummies yes 
Geographical dummies yes 
   
χ2 26.565(14)** 
No. observations 328.000 
Log-likelihood -167.870 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.067 
Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 
1%. Standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses. For the sake of synthesis, estimated coefficients of 
industry and geographic area dummies are not reported.  
9 
 
Table A.IV: Test for survivorship bias: Logit models. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
  DCommAllFirm DTechAllFirm DCVC DCommAllResOrg DTechAllResOrg DConsultResOrg 
α0 Constant -0.242 1.709* 11.818*** -0.962 0.410 0.267 
  (0.850) (0.962) (2.582) (1.082) (0.980) (0.971) 
α1 DAsu_Inci - 0.814 - - 0.093 - 
   (0.681)   (0.667)  
α2 DAsu_NoInci -0.224 0.124 6.179*** 0.224 1.217*** 1.113*** 
  (0.341) (0.369) (1.026) (0.432) (0.360) (0.356) 
α3 DNoAsu_Inci 0.141 0.154 -1.835** 0.847*** 1.081*** 0.566** 
  (0.262) (0.262) (0.877) (0.310) (0.260) (0.256) 
α4 EcoEduci 0.032 -0.124 -3.287*** 0.194 -0.062 0.108 
  (0.131) (0.126) (0.448) (0.143) (0.132) (0.134) 
α5 TechEduci 0.093*** 0.139*** 0.838*** 0.099* 0.168*** 0.166*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.149) (0.052) (0.039) (0.038) 
α6 TechWorkExpi 0.004 0.023 0.086* -0.162*** 0.000 -0.002 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.050) (0.053) (0.019) (0.022) 
α7 ComWorkExpi 0.033 -0.025 -0.353*** 0.023 0.008 -0.011 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.093) (0.041) (0.033) (0.031) 
α8 OtherWorkExpi -0.019 -0.048*** -0.159*** 0.008 -0.013 -0.005 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.056) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
α9 DManageri -0.070 -0.039 -2.715*** 0.060 0.001 0.262 
  (0.167) (0.177) (0.816) (0.244) (0.189) (0.189) 
α10 Agei -0.048 -0.106** 0.025 -0.210*** -0.057 -0.096* 
  (0.049) (0.053) (0.129) (0.066) (0.055) (0.058) 
α11 SqAgei 0.001 0.004** 0.004 0.006*** 0.002 0.003* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
α12 MillsExiti -0.043 -1.181** -13.180*** 0.413 -1.017* -0.982* 
  (0.456) (0.513) (1.802) (0.567) (0.525) (0.507) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geographical dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
χ2 50.664(17)*** 43.928(18)*** 84.550(16)*** 48.753(17)*** 78.265(18)*** 66.189(16)*** 
No. Observations 383 387 378 383 387 378 
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Log-likelihood -234.183 -211.356 -15.489 -92.997 -178.030 -148.212 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.102 0.092 0.741 0.221 0.191 0.168 
Wald χ2 test: α1= α2 - 1.06 (1) - - 2.96 (1)* - 
Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Robust standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses. 
For the sake of synthesis, estimated coefficients of industry and geographic area dummies are not reported.  
 
 
 
Table A.V: Definition of the additional control variables included in the econometric models. 
Variable Description 
Competitioni Mean value of the normalised answers of RITA firms’ owner-managers to questions concerning the degree of competition in the firm’s sector of 
activity. 
TechnoOpportunitiesi Ratio of the number of RITA firms that introduced radically innovative products or services compared to the offer of the industry to the total number of 
RITA firms in the industry. 
Appropriabilityi Mean value of the answers of RITA firms’ owner-managers to questions concerning the appropriability of technology in the firm’s sector of activity 
measured through a Likert scale from 1 (weak appropriability) to 6 (strong appropriability). 
Infrastructuresi Value of the index measuring regional infrastructures in 1992 (mean value among Italian regions=100). 
HighTechIntensityi Number of high-tech firms per thousand residents in the province where the focal start-up is located (source: ISTAT).  
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Table A.VI: Test for unobserved heterogeneity: Logit models. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
  DCommAllFirm DTechAllFirm DCVC DCommAllResOrg DTechAllResOrg DConsultResOrg 
α0 Constant 8.956*** 2.719 7.073 1.582 -2.438 -7.356* 
  (2.923) (3.098) (7.113) (5.069) (3.512) (4.152) 
α1 DAsu_Inci -0.188 -0.887* 0.796 -0.709 0.332 0.858* 
  (0.449) (0.498) (0.794) (0.632) (0.512) (0.492) 
α2 DAsu_NoInci -0.822** -1.117** 0.848 -0.140 0.988** 0.899** 
  (0.346) (0.456) (0.621) (0.525) (0.397) (0.410) 
α3 DNoAsu_Inci 0.386 0.290 -0.350 0.613 1.453*** 0.933** 
  (0.329) (0.323) (0.693) (0.426) (0.343) (0.382) 
α4 EcoEduci 0.032 0.133 0.266 0.327** -0.006 0.279** 
  (0.112) (0.118) (0.183) (0.155) (0.139) (0.142) 
α5 TechEduci 0.092** 0.103** 0.091 0.254*** 0.212*** 0.205*** 
  (0.044) (0.046) (0.083) (0.069) (0.054) (0.059) 
α6 TechWorkExpi -0.005 0.034 0.017 -0.186* -0.032 -0.028 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.038) (0.099) (0.028) (0.034) 
α7 ComWorkExpi 0.038 0.026 -0.011 0.006 0.061** 0.034 
  (0.034) (0.029) (0.062) (0.039) (0.028) (0.034) 
α8 OtherWorkExpi -0.023* -0.013 0.018 0.010 0.007 0.008 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
α9 DManageri 0.000 0.059 0.544 0.055 0.088 0.330 
  (0.209) (0.222) (0.376) (0.340) (0.260) (0.286) 
α10 Agei 0.095* -0.067 0.111 -0.127 0.133** 0.051 
  (0.057) (0.060) (0.112) (0.083) (0.066) (0.078) 
α11 SqAgei -0.005** 0.002 -0.003 0.004 -0.005* -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
α12 Competitioni -0.838* -0.477 -1.520 -0.960 -1.062* -0.783 
  (0.433) (0.476) (1.280) (0.794) (0.549) (0.612) 
α13 TechnoOpportunitiesi -0.090 -0.016 -0.075 -0.409 0.210 0.198 
  (0.238) (0.268) (0.393) (0.400) (0.268) (0.280) 
α14 Appropriabilityi -1.993*** -0.682 -3.111** -0.755 -0.037 0.926 
  (0.760) (0.808) (1.554) (1.364) (0.902) (1.041) 
α15 Infrastructuresi -0.012*** -0.005 0.014 0.011 0.001 0.005 
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  (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
α16 HighTechIntensityi 4.108 -0.258 -5.012 -9.972* -12.893*** -11.151** 
  (3.511) (3.685) (7.869) (5.272) (4.475) (4.994) 
        
χ2 40.394(16)*** 24.947(16)*** 24.192(16)*** 43.203(16)*** 72.008(16)*** 51.176(16)*** 
No. Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551 
Log-likelihood -353.897 -319.875 -118.450 -156.997 -261.558 -213.195 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.065 0.042 0.072 0.122 0.144 0.125 
Wald χ2 test: α1= α2 1.57 (1) 0.15 (1) 0.00 (1) 0.70 (1) 1.27 (1) 0.01 (1) 
Legend: *Significance level greater than 10%; **significance level greater than 5%; ***significance level greater than 1%. Robust standard errors and number of restrictions are in parentheses.  
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